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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NEW DEAL
MEASURES.*
T is not enough to consider merely the letter of our Con-
stitution in seeking to determine the constitutionality of
recovery measures. The Constitution has spirit as well as let-
ter, substance concealed in its form and purpose that is all
too frequently obscured by over-emphasis upon the methods
by which the purpose of government is to be effectuated.
Lawyers, of all people, should not be guilty of confusing
principles with methods. And yet much of the legal criticism
that has been leveled at the so called New Deal fairly bristles
with misunderstanding of the purpose of American govern-
ment as distinguished from the forms and processes of gov-
ernmental operation. Lawyers have drifted into the habit of
becoming more concerned over "how" the government works
than they are concerned with "why" the government is called
upon to work at all.
During the past year it has been customary to begin any
criticism of recovery measures with references to "the Con-
stitution." The Constitution, as we all know, was written in
1787 and ratified in 1789. It is a matter of common knowl-
edge, however, that we declared our independence of Great
Britain in 1776 and concluded the treaty of peace which
*An address delivered at various bar association meetings.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
established us as a separate nation in 1781. It is patent there-
fore that government in America did not begin with the
Constitution of 1787. The American States were function-
ing under American forms of government for more than a
dozen years prior to the adoption of the Constitution.
What was the objective of government in these pre-Con-
stitutional days? What was the lodestar of American gov-
ernmental operation in the Revolutionary years and in the
years immediately succeeding the Revolution? References
to the "Fathers of the Constitution" invariably include the
names of Washington, Franklin, Madison, Hamilton, and
Jefferson. Such an august member of the critical nobility as
James M. Beck says that "While Jefferson was not a mem-
ber of the Constitutional Convention, his ideal of liberty
was one of its inspirations." All of the "Fathers" that I have
just named were Fathers of the American Revolution as
well as Fathers of the American Constitution. Much of our
difficulty in present-day Constitutional construction would
be eliminated if we could better integrate the purposes of
the Revolution with the purposes of the Constitution which
was drawn up a dozen years after our independence was.de-
clared.
Through the Declaration of Independence we decided to
discharge the British government and hire a governmental
agent of our own. Further on in the same Declaration, the
"Fathers" plainly stated just what the American govern-
mental agent was expected to do. How it was expected to do
it was not described in detail save only that its powers should
be derived from the people themselves.
The Declaration of Independence marked out the direc-
tion in which American government was to move. The meth-
od of transportation was not described. This was a simple
and supremely sensible omission. When the "Fathers" went
from one place to another they used a stage-coach, but the
method of transportation did not alter the fixed point of
their destination. We travel to those same places today in
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automobiles, railroad trains, and airplanes. Methods have
changed, but the destinations are in exactly the same places
they were in 1776. Here is what the "Fathers" said about
the destination of American government in the first official
American state paper, the Declaration of Independence:
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."
Thus it is seen that the object-the destination-of Ameri-
can government is the protection of the life and liberty of
the citizen.
The American governmental agent was hired by the
"Fathers" to achieve this purpose. In the years immediately
succeeding the Declaration, the power of the agent was in-
creased from time to time; first by the adoption of the
Articles of Confederation, secondly by the adoption of our
present Federal Constitution, and lastly by judicial con-
struction. But never in any place was it suggested that the
purpose for which the agent was employed was to be modi-
fied or changed in the slightest particular.
The Supreme Court of the United States has frequently
taken cognizance of this fundamental postulate. For in-
stance, in the case of the Railway Company v. Ellis 1 Mr.
Justice Brewer says:
"The first official action of this nation declared the foundation of
government in these words: [Quoting the Declaration of Independ-
ence]. While such declaration of principles may not have the force of
organic law, or be made the basis of judicial decision as to the limits
of right and duty, and while in all cases reference must be had to the
organic law of the nation for such limits, yet the latter [the Constitu-
tion] is but the body and the letter of which the former [the Declara-
tion of Independence] is the thought and the spirit, and it is always
safe to read the letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declara-
tion of Independence."
1 165 U. S. 150, 159, 160 (1896).
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The orthodox in Constitutional construction therefore
makes the Declaration of Independence the substance of
that for which the Constitution is the form. It is in this spirit
that we should approach a consideration of present govern-
mental measures. The governmental agent today is con-
fronted with the task of protecting the citizen under cir-
cumstances vastly different from those which confronted
either the government or the citizen in 1776 or 1789. It was
one thing to protect the inalienable rights of man in the for-
est and field conditions of the eighteenth century; it is quite
another thing to protect those rights in the complicated con-
gestion of this day and age.
Regulation of persons and things is never justified nor
justifiable as an end in itself. Regulation for the sake of
regulation is paternalism; but regulation as the only means
for individual protection is a bulwark of our traditional
American liberty. Regulation finds its only justification in
the proof of the fact that it is a necessary means for ade-
quate protection of the citizen's rights. The practice of fraud,
for instance, in 1789 was simple and elemental as compared
with the advanced efficiency of fraudulent practice today.
That conservatism is archaic, if not criminal, which would
insist that government police the radio with those methods
found adequate for the Pony Express.
The principle of inalienable liberty sounded in the Declar-
ation of Independence may be readily translated into terms
of modern conditions by reference to the ancient legal max-
im: "Sic utere tuo ut alienam non laedas." That is, "So use
your own as not to injure others." This is a fundamental
restriction applied in every age, and casting upon govern-
ment the duty to see that changing and complicated cir-
cumstances do not form a mask for the invasion of our
neighbor's rights.
The turn of the century witnessed the growth of corporate
combination in industry. Remember that a corporation is
a creature of the state, whereas the individual is the creator
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of the state. To permit the hireling of the servant to throttle
the life out of the servant's master would be as illogical as
it would be unjust. In considering the constitutionality of
the government's regulation of corporations therefore, we
must admit at the outset that in dealing with corporations
the government is managing its own creatures. As long as
such management and regulation is calculated and reason-
ably adapted to the protection of the citizen, there can be
little question concerning the propriety of the government's
procedure.
Simply because a corporation, or an individual for that
matter, has established a perfectly valid property right to a
thick club is no reason for assuming that he has a right to
swing it in any direction, with disastrous effect upon the
heads and shoulders of his near neighbors. Property, when
grouped and located in certain particular ways, may affect
the rights of citizens just as directly and just as disastrously
as a club swung promiscuously in a crowded room. To say
that government is powerless to prevent either the one or
the other is to deny the very fundamentals of the Declara-
tion of Independence.
Industrial practice changes much more rapidly than judi-
cial precedent customarily develops. Productive processes
are as volatile as judicial determinations are slow and con-
servative. It is as impossible, and perhaps as undesirable,
to slow down the one as it is to speed up the other. But it
is well to remember that if a car of the motorist may easily
outdistance the motorcycle of the traffic policeman, regu-
latory speed laws, designed in the interests of individual pro-
tection, will be practically and effectively repealed.
The governmental recovery measures have suddenly
moved the protective processes to which the citizen is en-
titled, suddenly and squarely up abreast of the industrial
procession. Judicial determination, which has unfortunately
been concerned more directly with methods than with prin-
ciples, has consequently been left many miles in the rear.
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Unless lawyers and judges take the proper perspective there-
fore, we are apt to hear the sorrowful confession that Ameri-
can government is no longer able to protect the American
citizen.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the much-
publicized Minnesota Mortgage Case, indicates that that
august tribunal is prepared to take high ground in its ob-
servation of what government has found it necessary to do
for the protection of life, liberty, and property-in that or-
der- as a result of the depression. In that case, Home
Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell,2 Chief Justice
Hughes, writing the majority opinion, says:
"The settlement and consequent contraction of the public domain,
the pressure of a constantly increasing density of population, the in-
terrelation of the activities of our people and the complexity of our
economic interests, have inevitably led to an increased use of the or-
ganization of society [government] in order to protect the very bases
of individual opportunity." (Italics mine.)
Note that the Chief Justice states that the object of govern-
ment has been to protect "individual opportunity." Our
drift has not been towards the socialization of the state.
The purpose of measures such as the Minnesota Moratorium
Law has not been to subordinate the individual to the neces-
sities of the group. On the contrary, the purpose of this
measure, as seen by the Supreme Court, has been to prevent
the individual from being submerged, to prevent the en-
slavement of the individual by combinations of impersonal
capital. It is to prevent Socialism, and not to establish it,
that recovery measures have been adopted by national and
state governments.
Our American system from 1776 to date has been predi-
cated upon the theory that the individual has some inalien-
able rights that everybody else, including his government, is
bound to respect. If our civilization is to be allowed to drift
casually by the forces of economic gravitation into a capital-
2 78 L. Ed. 271, 54 S. Ct. 231, 241 (1934).
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istic feudalism where the barons of money and monopoly
move their rightless human chattels about like pawns upon
a chessboard, then indeed has the noble aspiration of the
Declaration of Independence disappeared in the blue smoke
that pours from the factories and furnaces of industry. If
the powers of government are not adequate for the protec-
tion of the citizen, if the trunk of principle and purpose is to
be obscured by the ivy of method that has gathered around
the bark; then the only alternative is direct action and
revolution with all of the chaos, confusion, disaster, and
bloodshed that have always attended direct action through-
out history. To think of the Constitution as method rather
than principle, to honor its form and ignore its substance, is
to destroy the document while we give lip service to its
inviolability. The "Fathers" who wrote and subscribed to
the Declaration of Independence, as well as to the Constitu-
tion, would have never embraced such a disastrous alterna-
tive.
Clarence Manion.
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